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1. Introduction 
In 1988, when British Muslims petitioned their government to ban Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses, 
they discovered that the existing blasphemy law did not prohibit insults to the Prophet Mehammad. It only 
applied to Christianity an4 accordingly, the government rejected the petition. The home minister for race 
relati;% John Patten, subsequently, wrote a document, lecturing the Muslims and the general public, "on 
being British". Tala1 Asad has brilliantly analysed the political implications of the liberal views, expressed in 
this text. One of the crucial aims of Patten's text was to delineate "a common national culture". According to 
Patten this commonality was to be found in "our democracy and our laws, the English language, and the 
history that has shaped modem Britain" (quoted in Asad 1993: 244). In this paper I want to address two 
things which are erased in Patten's discussion of "being British": Christianity and Empire. It is, of course, 
quite understandable that a politician would not mention Chrkthnity as a major component of British 
I 
culture at the height of the "Rushdie-affair". Nevertheless, the laws to which Patten referred included a 
blasphemy law which only protected Christian sentiments. Moreover, no one will doubt that Christianity is a 
crucial element in the history that shaped Britain. 
Similarly, there is a silent assumption in Patten's document that Wing British" has nothing to do 
with empire. In other words that the problem of confliding values, as it emerged in the Rushdie case, was a 
new problem, brought to Britain by immigration; that it only had to do with empire in so far as the 
immigrants came from the former empire, another instance of "the empire strikes back". Nevertheless, it 
could well be argued that Patten's arguments, calling for acceptance of a common, national culture, as well 
as those of Muslim leaders, c a h g  for the religious neutrality of the state, as shown by rbe plitiwi 
protection of the beliefs of all religious communities, are rooted in the same history of empire but as 
experienced on opposite sides of the colonizing process. It is sometimes said that the British are unaware of 
their history, because it took place elsewhere. My own reading indeed suggest that the imperial co~ec t ion  is 
indeed too seldom consciously reflected upon by historians of Britain, let alone British policians. Historians 
of India are much more aware of the imperial connection, but tend to ignore the developments in the 
metropole, afraid of making the history of the colony into a footnote of European history. In this paper I will 
attempt to show some structural similarities and differences between the development of religion and 
nationalism in Britain and India. I will have to warn the reader, however, that this paper is not written (as 
usual) in medias res, but at the very start of a new project. I should stress therefore that everything I argue 
here is at most tentative and preliminary. 
That Mr Patten could get away with not mentioning Christianity as a component of Britain's national 
culture is due to the fact that organized Christianity has been gradually marginalized in British society over 
the course of the twentieth century. Britain is now a so-called secular sodety, in which Christianity, allegedly, 
has become a private matter for individuals with no political relevance in the public sphere. Without denying 
the significant changes in the location of religion in British society in this century I am wary of the 
assumptions inherent in the concept of 'sedaritf. One major element in that concept is the separation of 
Church and State. However, as we know, this element is not found in Britain. The Church of England is the 
British national Church. The Queen is still head of the state church and the bishops, appointed by the Crown 
on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, are present in the House of Lords. Even in 1980 a leading 
article in The Times argued that it would be undesirable if the Prince of Wales would marry a Roman 
Catholic (quoted in Robbins 1982: 465). In the meantime a number of undesirable things appear to have 
happened in the British royal house and one wonders whether this particular opinion would be expressed 
today. Nevertheless, this opinion from a leading newspaper in a so-called 'secular' society, is quite 
remarkable in its insistence on the Protestant nature of the state. 
Another way of looking at 'seculuratity' is developed in the 'secularization-thesis', about which I have 
some general doubts. The boredom that takes hold of almost any audience when one speaks about 
contemporary religion is perhaps the most striking effect of the secularization-thesis which, basically, 
expresses that we already know everything that there is to be known about religion, namely that it declines. 
The success of industrialization, science and technology has made religion in the modern world obsolete. In 
sociological theories of modernity the transition from the pre-modern, rural community to the modern, 
industrial and urbanized society is said to be marked by the decline of religion as an expression of the moral 
unity of society. 
In the European discussion of secularization it is decline of church attendance and of numbers of 
churches which are good indicators of change. Starting with the last decades of the nineteenth century there 
seems to be such a decline in England, although there is considerable debate about periodization and 
interpretation of that decline. Catholicism, for instance, continues to grow substantially till the Second World 
War. In the Netherlands -to take another European example- decline begins only in the 1950s. Again, in the 
United States it all looks somewhat different. The American churches have always been very creative in 
recruiting church members, as is witnessed over the last decades by televangelism. For Chrkthity church 
membership and church attendance are good indicators and from them we can only conclude that the 
historical picture is rather different from one Western society to another, so that a generalized secularization 
story will not do. This is not only true for the facts and figures of church attendance and membership, but 
also for the causal explanations of industrialization and rationalization, offered by secularization theory. For 
example, there is more evidence for religious expansion during the Industrial Revolution in England than for 
seuhization. Similarly, there is currently a consensus among historians that the impact of scientific discov- 
ery, such as those of Darwin, on the decline of religion has, previously, been much exaggerated. 
If the seahkat ion thesis does not account for the history of Western Christianity, it is even less 
applicable to the history of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and most other religions. In the latter cases the 
question about church attendance and membership cannot even be raised, since there are no churches. The 
organization of religion, the place of religion in society, the pattern of recruitment are so different that not 
only secularization theory itself, but also the empirical and theoretical problems which are derived from it in 
the context of Western Christianity, become meaningless. This has not prevented social scientists to 
universalize this ill-founded story about the West to include the rest. Since all societies modernize and 
secularization is an intrinsic part of modernization, all societies secularize, the rhetoric, dressed up as 
argument, goes. 
In recent years much doubt has been thrown on the secularization of India and the ultimate triumph 
of secularism. The anthropologist T.N. Madan (1987: 748) has, for instance, argued that "secularism as a 
widely shared worldview has failed to make headway in India". Since Indians are Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists 
or Sikhs, they are not Protestant Christians. They cannot and will not privatize their religion (ibidem, 749). 
Madan points out that in sodological theory, especially that of Max Weber, there is an essential linkage 
between Protestantism, individualism, and secularization (753). He argues, accordingly, that secularism is a 
"gift of Christianity to mankind" and that it is part of the unique history of Europe (753754). Madan 
expresses what appears to be a general consensus among both social scientists and the general public that the 
modem West is uniquely secular and the East uniquely religious. The problem with this consensus is that it 
reduces complex and diverse histories to the biiary opposition of sedarity and religiosity. We have already 
seen that the history of sealaxity in Western societies is varied and compleq the same can be said about the 
development of religious institutions in India. Nevertheless, the appeal of these essentializations cannot be 
dkmked by providing ever more complicated narratives of social change. It is in fact pretty hard to get rid 
of theories of modernization and secuhhtion, however much one tries to get away from them. One is 
forced to address the conceptual complexities and contradictions involved in them. 
In my view the crucial relation which has to be analysed is that of state, nation and religion. The 
modem state is a nation-state and the hyphen indicates that the modem state requires a nation and vice 
versa. Although Britain and India are now both nation-states, in the colonial period only Britain was a 
nation-state, while India was a colony. This, at least, 'seem to indicate a time-lag, in which colonizing Britain 
was an established nation-state and colonized India became one- perhaps as a result of colonization. Howe- 
ver, one has to remember that the nation is.a 19th-century historical formation, so that the time-lag it is a 
relatively minor one. Another way of putting t!is is to say that in the same period that Britain is colonizing 
India, England is colonizipg Greater Britain, trying to unify what is not yet (and will only partially be) the 
united kingdom. We can see the historical outcome of the latter process even today in Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. I do not want to make too much of this, but simply want to point out that a notion of time-lag, in 
which blueprints of a finished nation-state are exported to less-evolved societies via colonialism, may lead us 
to miss the procasual and differential nature of nation-state formation. And to miss as well that this process 
involved Britain and India simultaneously, within the same historical time. 
Often the question is raised what comes f ~ s t  in this hyphenated phenomenon, nation or state? Does 
the state produce the people or the people the state? I am in agreement with Marcel Mauss who in his 
d i e d  work on "the nationm argues that the idea of the 'nation' combines in the collective spirit the idea 
of the "fatherlandl (patrie) and the idea of the citizen: 
;;-: 
"...these two notions of fatherland and citizen are ultimately nothing but a single institution, 
one and the same rule of practical and ideal morals and, in reality, one and the same central 
,-A- -- *- fact which gives the modem republic all its originality, aII its novelty and its incomparable 
moral digni ty.. The individual -every individual- is born in political life ... A society in its 
entirety has to some extent become the State, the sovereign political body it is the totality 
of citizens" (1969: 592. 593; orig. 1920s). 
In his provocative and profound way Mauss does away with any sharp distinction between state and society. 
Where Renan had suggested that the nation was a daily plebiite, a deliberate choice, M a w  argued that it 
was a collective belief in homogeneity, as if the nation were a primitive dan, supposedly composed of equal 
I 
I citizens, symbolised by its flag (its totem), having a cult of the fatherland, just as the primitive clan has its 
I ancestor cults.In Mauss's view the modem nation believes in its race, ("it is because the nation creates race 
that one believes that the race creates the nation") (5%), its language, its civilization, its national character. 
This collective belief is recent, modem and to a very considerable extent the result of public, obligatory 
education. The idea of national character is intimately tied to the idea of progress (604). 
What we find in M a w  is a rejection of the common distinction between civil ties and primordial 
bonds, between citizenship and ideas of ehnicity, race, language and religion In his view they all go together 
in a complex transformation of society into the nation-state. For M a w  one of the most interesting aspeds of 
this process is that it produces simultaneously the individual and the nation. In Foucault's terms, the state is 
totalizing and individuabhg at the same time. The boundaries of the state are notoriously difficult to define. 
The state appears to be a sovereign authority above and outside society, but Foucault has pointed out that 
the modem state works internally through disciplinary power not by constraining individuals and their actions 
but by producing them. The individual, avi l  political subject is produced in churches, schools and factories. 
Timothy Mitchel (1991: 93) has recently argued that it is the peculiarity of the modem state phenomenon 
that "at the same time as power relations become internal in this way, and by the same methods, they now 
appear to take the novel form of external structuresn. The state is thus to be analyzed as a structural effect. 
Where does this leave religion? In Mauss (as in Durkheim) there are constant allusions to the idea 
that nationalism is the religion of modern society, just as clan totemism is the religion of primitive society. If 
that is the case, could one then say that Christianity (or Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism) is the religion of the 
ancien regime and nationalism the secular religion of modem society? Our previous argument about the 
secularization thesis has already shown that this is a much too simple idea of one thing replacing another. An 
implication of Mauss's argument appears to be that what happened to race and language in the age of 
nationalism also happened to religion. It becomes a defining feature of the nation and for that purpose it is 
transformed in a certain direction. Religion is nationalized, so to say. It becomes one of the fields of 
disciplinary practice in which the modem civil subject is produced. Not the only one, obviously, since 
language, literature, race, avil'ition are all other fields producing what Mauss called 'the national character'. 
That religion is important in producing the modem subject should not sound too strange for those 
familiar with Weber's discussion of the Protestant Ethic. That it also is important in producing the modem 
public is perhaps more startling, especially if one stresses that in the 19th century it is not only Protestantism 
that is nationalkd, but also Catholicism and many other religions, such as Warn and Hinduism in India. 
One can hear the immediate objection that Protestantism became the national religion of England and the 
Low Countries already in the 16th century. However, I would suggest that in the early-modern period there 
are Protestant state churches in these countries, but since they are not yet nation-states there is no national 
religion. In'other words, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there are major changes in religion 
underway which affect its organization, its impact, its reach. These changes have to do with the rise of that 
hyphenated phenomenon, the nation-state. 
Implicit in my argument thus far is that 'the modem subject' is produced together with 'the modem 
public'. Consequently, religion is not only important in in the shaping of 'individual conscience' and 'avilized 
conduct', but also in the creation of thk public sphere. This may come as a surprise to those who accept 
Jurgen Habermas's understanding of the rise of 'the public sphere'. In his Strukturwandlung der 
Oeffentlichkeit (1%2) Habermas argued that private individuals assembled into a public body began in the 
eighteenth century to discuss critically the exercise of political power by the state. These citizens had free 
access to information and expressed their opinion in a rational and domination-free (herrschaftsfreie) 
manner. In my view Habermas's analysis of the Enlightenment tradition belongs, at the theoretical level, very 
much to a discourse of modern, European self-representation. A striking element in this self-representation 
is the neglect of religious, public opinion which cannot be regarded as 'rational' and 'critical'. 
In Habermas's model we have a picture of European development in which "secularity" is one of the 
distinguishing features of "modernity". This picture is simply false. Enlightenment did not kill religion in 
Europe. It did not do so in the 18th century when there was a direct connection between natural science and 
natural religion. As Margaret Jacobs (1992) has recently argued: "Habermas's individuals are far too seculari- 
zed". Jacobs focuses on the new religiosity of the enlightened few, such as the Deists in England (see also 
Zaret 1992). I would, however, like to draw attention to the organizational activities which developed out 
18th century evangelism. While early evangelism -as, for example, methodism- was already developing new 
communication networks, this development received a very strong impetus at the turn of the century. I am 
thk ing  here of anti-slavery societies, Bible societies k d  missionary societies round 1900 which -at least in 
Britain (the prime subject of Habermas's analysis)- were instrumental in aeating a modern public sphere on 
which the nation-state could be built. I would therefore suggest that the notions of 'publiaty', 'the public' and 
'public opinion', captured in Habermas's concept of 'the public sphere' are important an can be used for 
comparative purposes if we are not going to be constrained by Habermas's Enlightenment perspective. 
In the remainder of this paper I want to look at the nationalization of religion in Britain and India. I 
hope to show that the developments in the metropole and in the colony had important features in common, 
but that there are also substantial differences which have to do with the way state, nation and religion are 
related in these two sites of the empire. 
2. The Moral State in Britain 
In nineteenth-century Britain there are two major religious developments which connect religion to 
nationalism. The first is the enormous growth and impact of evangelicalism on the entire religious culture of 
Britain. The second is the inclusion and enfranchisement of Catholics in the nation. Let me start with 
evangelicalism. Evangelical Revival starts conventionally with John Wesley in the fist half of the eighteenth 
century, but there was an important second wave in the 1790s which lasted into the nineteenth century 
(Wolffe 1995: 22). The growth of evangelical movements in the first half of the 19th century is spectacular, 
but more than these numbers is the considerable impact evangelicalism had on religious groups 
and individuals of every kind. The evangelical expansion coincided largely with that of the Industrial 
Revolution which has led to all kinds of more or less econornistic causal explanations, ranging from those 
given by Elie Halevy to those offered by Edward Thompson. All these explanations have subsequently been 
subjected to substantial criticisms and I do not want to go into that here. Whatever the causalities involved it 
is important for my purpose to point out that evangelicalism aimed at inward conversion, but also at an 
outward activity in converting others. Itinerant preachers and later bible societies and missionary societies 
reached fa .  and deep. What one has here is a strong avilizing and educational effort aimed at transforming 
people's personal lives. There can be little doubt about the importance of evangelicalism in producing 
modern, civil and hard working individuals. 
At the same time evangelidism had a very significant political impad. There are obviously a broad 
range of ideas and attitudes covered with the term 'evangelicalism', but its campaign for the abolition of 
slavery in the first decades of the nineteenth century shows how evangelicalism despite its diversity could 
have a strong political message. Here we see also how evangelicalism at home was conneded to the empire, 
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as exernplifred in the words of William W'iberforce, one of the leaders of the e-t&cal clapham sect: 
'I w i d e r  it my duty to endeavour to deliver these poor creatures from their present 
darkr~ess and degradation, not merely out of a dired regard for their well being ... but also 
from a direct persuasion that both the colonists and we ourselves shall be otherwise the 
sufferers. The judicial and penal visitations of Providence occur commonly in the way of 
natural consequence and it is in that way I should expecf the evils to occur." (quoted in 
Hilton 1988: 209-210). 
David Brion Davis suggests that the abolition of the Slave Trade in 1807 and of slavery in 1833 were 'genuine 
rituals', evoking fantasies of death and r e b i i  and "designed to revitalize Christianity and atone for national 
guilt" (Davis 1984, quoted in Hilton 1988: 210). 
These attitudes towards the rest of the world were new and thoroughly modem. Until the 1790s 
there was hardly any interest in missionization abroad. The 1790's proved a turning-point, however, which is 
perhaps best captured in the title of W i  Carey's book An Enauirv into the Obli~ation of Christians. t~ 
Use Means for the Conversion of the Heathew (1792). A great number of missionary societies were 
founded, including the well-known LMS and CMS. All these societies saw themselves engaged in a battle 
against idolatry and an endeavour to save heathen souls. Not only were these souls thought to go to hell, if 
not saved, but it came to be seen as a Christian duty 'to save them. One can only wonder about the extent to 
which Christian imagination in Britain was fueled by the imagery of the poor Hindus, Muslims and others 
b e i i  lost for eternity. What we do know is that one out of two missionary speakers at provincial anniversary 
meetings of missionary societies between 1838 to 1873 came from India (Stanley 1983: 278).There can be 
little doubt that the simultaneous evangelical activities of Bible societies, missionary ,-eties, and Sunday 
Schools created a public awareness of a particular kind of world and an imperial duty of British Christians in 
the empire. 
I see evangelicalism as a very broad, religious force, adive both within and outside the established 
church. By 1850 about one-third of Anglican clergymen, including many of the brightest and the best, could 
be designated 'evangelical' and so could the vast majority of Nonconformists (Hilton 1988: 26). I take this to 
imply that the earlier strong divide between the established church and nonconformism was, to some extent, 
bridged by evangelidh. This divide did obviously continue to exist in political debates about church-state 
relations, but Dissent appears to have Iog i;; radid anA' ,i-Establishment politics within evangelicalism which, 
basically, promoted a middle-class piety with strong elements of civil and frugal behaviour and national 
honour. Certainly, one can point at the extremist elements within the movement with their millenarian, 
adventist antinomianism which seem to perpetuate the earlier chararcteristics of eighteenth-century dissent. 
These elements remained significant throughout the century and into the twentieth-century. In a number of 
cases their outbursts of religious fervor pushed influential men, like Gladstone (1809-1898), from 
evangelicalism towards High Church. Nevertheless, one can continue to see in the Liiral  leader Gladstone a 
strong evangelical streak which informed his political views and actions (Hiiton 1988: 340). Similarly, several 
generations later, C.F. Andrews (1871-1940), missionary and later friend of Tagore and Gandhi, left the 
Irvingite congregation, in which his father was a minister, for High Church only to become a missionary and 
later a moralist supporter of Indian nationalism. Andrews did not feel close to the religious atmosphere in 
which his father, who had the powers of prophesy and h e a h  conducted his services. Nevertheless, he 
became a missionary who soon felt the constraints of High Church Anglicanism as too limiting. One can 
easily see the influence of evangelical moralism in C.F. Andrews's positions (Ti ie r  1979). 
In mainstream evangelicalism religious enthousiasm was channeled into public activity, spreading 
middle-class values over the larger population. By and large it does not seem correct to see the evangelical 
movement as an anti-rational movement. Rather it was a movement which tried to combine rational thought 
and religious 'feeling', sense and sensibility. In that and other aspects I interpret it as a typical nationalist 
movement which tries to combine enlightenment with romanticism. W e  there is constant debate between 
utilitarian liberals and evangelicals there is considerable evidence of the common ground between them in 
the way John Stuart Mill tried to distance himself from the hyper-rationalism of his father (Zastoupil 1994). 
The evangelical project was to convert the people to a morally inspired existence, in which individual 
conscience of sins and atonement are catchwords, within a nation with a mission. 
Gladstone is an interesting example of the combination of liiralism and evangelical moralism. 
Brought up in a devoutly evangelical family he began his cateer under the influence of the poet-philosopher 
Coleridge's book, On the constitution of Church and State (1829). To defend the established church in the 
aftermath of Catholic Emancipation he wrote a book, entitled The State ~II its relations with 7 % ~  Cncrrh 
(1838), in which he endows the state with a conscience which transcends that of individuals. In this treatise 
he argued not only for a strong tie between the Church and the State, but endowed the state with high moral 
qualities: 
"the State is properly and according to its nature , mor al... It means that the general action 
of the State is under a moral law... In the government and laws of a country we find not a 
mere aggregation of individual acts but a composite agen cy... This composite agency 
represents the personality of the nation; and, as a great distinct moral reality, demands a 
worship of its own, namely, the worship of the State, represented in b living and governing 
members, and therefore a public and joint worship. To sum up then in a few words the 
result of these considerations, religion is applicable to the State, because it is the office of 
the State in its personality to evolve the social life of man, which social life is essentially 
moral in the ends it contemplates, in the subject-matter on which it feeds, and in the 
restraints and motives it requires; and which can only be effectually moral when it is 
religious. Or, religion is directly necessary to the right employment of the enregies of the 
State" (Gladstone 1838 in Helmstadter and Phillips 1985: 82-89). 
Since Gladstone became later in his career a defendant of the rights of dissenters and Catholics, it has been 
argued that he completely repudiated his earlier views (Hilton: 341). I would, however, suggest that we see in 
Gladstone a shift from the early-modem viewof the public church to the moral nation-state, in which not the 
state bureauaacy, but individual and national conscience were paramount. What remains constant is the 
moral/religious nature of political activity. Instead of excluding others from this moral life of the nation he 
now wanted to include them alL This meant a repudiation of a strictly Calvinist notion of the 'few elect' to be 
replaced by a moral universalism which extended grace to all the inhabitants of the world. There is a vision 
here of a national church or the nation as a church which goes beyond the visible, institutional Church of 
England. 
Such a fusion of church and nation-state was also crucial to the civilizing mission, as envisioned by 
Thomas Arnold in his The Prina~les of Church Reform (1833). While Arnold was still doubtfult of the 
desirabiity of including Roman Catholics (Irish barbarians) and the chance that dissenting groups would join 
this christianizing and civilizing mission, these doubts were soon overtaken by new realities on the ground. 
The liberal dodrine of the improvement of society fits extraordinary well with this Christian moralism. In this 
regard it is interesting to see that Coleridge did not only intluence Gladstone and Arnold, but also that 
principal spokesman of liberal ideas in the 19th century, John Stuart Mill (Zastoupil 1994). Instead of the 
usual evangelical views of damnation and the end of times there is in Gladstone a liberal view of progress, 
but added to this is the notion that progress is the Christian improvement of society and that in such 
progress we see the hand of God. This mixture of liberal and evangelical ideas leads to a quite general 
emphasis on the moral character of the English people and their duty to lead the world (Robbins 1982: 470- 
471). These views of progress and grace for all were not confined to the British isles, but included the 'white 
man's burden' to bring the gospel to the colonies. 
The shift from an Anglican excluvist vision of the nation to an inclusivist nationalism is reflected in 
the other major religious development of the period, the emancipation of the Catholics. Eighteenth-century 
England had been very much a Protestant State, but the creation of the British nation-state required the 
inclusion of the Catholic minority. There was a considerable history of anti-Catholic hostility in England 
which resulted in excluding Catholics from most areas of public life. From 1800 Roman Catholicism, like 
evangelicalism, experienced a tremendous growth. In England this was both the result of an increase of 
English Catholics and of a great influx of Irish immigrants. In Ireland there was an expansion of Roman 
Catholic activity, marked by the foundation of an Irish priest-training college at Maynooth in 1795. Roman 
Catholicism, like evangelicalism, also had an influence outside its fold. This is most clear in the Oxford 
Movement (also called the Tractarians), from 1833 onwards a movement towards e m p h a s i i  the catholicity 
of the Church of England, called Anglo-Catholicism. John Henry Newman (1801-1890), one of the luminaries 
of the movement, replaced the 'Anglo' for the 'Roman' in 1845 and rose to become a Roman Catholic 
cardinal in 1879. 
Evangelicals saw the growth in numbers of Roman Catholics as a threat which was compounded by their 
understandable fear for 'the enemy within' constituted by the Oxford Movement. In the 1820's the political 
struggle was about the right of Roman Catholics to sit in the united Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland 
which was decided in 1829 by the Emancipation. Not only Roman Catholics were now allowed to become 
part of the nation, but also dissenters whose civil disabiities were revoked by the Test and Corporation Acts 
in 1828. One has to interpret the books by Coleridge, Arnold and Gladstone in the light of these events 
which definitely served to transform the religious and political character of British society in w ~ c a n t  ways. 
The enfranchisement of the Catholic minority in the British isles did, however, little to prevent the 
strong connection which grew between Roman Catholicism and Irish nationalism.' This connection emerged 
very dearly in the Repeal agitation of 1843, in which the Roman Catholic clergy and Irish nationalists worked 
hand in hand to attack the legislative union between Britain and Ireland. This movement, supported by 
Roman Catholic organizational structures, drew huge popular support. It is not exaggerated to see Irish 
nationalism as the strongest example of religious nationalism in Greater Britain. The emancipation of 
Catholics had thus not succeeded in drawing in the Irish Catholics into the British nation which continued to 
have a too strong English character. Likewise, the Scottish Presbyterians were not immediately inclined to be 
part of an English/British nation which was marked by the Disruption in 1843, in which half of the 
Established Church's clergy left to form the Free Church of Scotland, As in England, evangelicalism worked 
here to promote the cause of nationalism, but this time it was Scottish nationalism. The main inspiration to 
form the Free Church was an evangelical urge to be close to 'the people', but, as a corollary, the Disruption 
was marked by anti-English sentiments (which remain strong till the present day) as expressed in opposition 
to Westminster as well as to anglicized landlords. Not nearly as strong as in Iraland, nationalism in SchotIand 
was nevertheless also marked by religious overtones. The same may be true for the connection between 
Welsh linguistic nationalism and Nonconformist religion 
Catholic Emancipation undid any illusion people like Thomas Arnold may have had about Britain as 
a Protestant nation Anti-Catholic feelings among the Protestant majority did not prevent Roman-Catholics 
to grow to the largest single church in England in the twentieth century (Wolffe 1995: 69). At the same time 
building 'Greater Britain', including Ireland, into a nation proved impossible in the face of the successful 
combination of Roman Catholicism and Irish nationalism. Anti-Catholicism was very strong in the 
Evangelical movement, but I want to emphasize that both Catholicism and Evangelicalism -in a dynamic fed 
by mutual rivalry- expanded substantially in the first half of the 19th century. Both movements were 
' This section is largely based on a discussion of Irish, 
Scottish and Welsh nationalisms in Wolffe.1995. 
simultaneously expanding and trying to dominate an emerging public sphere which made nationalism 
possible. Evangelical Awakening and Roman Catholic Revival are most profitably seen as two connected 
aovements which derived much of their expansionist energy from their mutual rivalry (Wolffe 1995: 37). In 
this connection it is interesting to note that evangelidism, despite its anti-Catholicism, even influenced 19th 
century most famous convert to Catholicism, John Henry Newman, as he candidly admitted in his A~olopia 
Pro Vita Sua (1864). 
From the 1830s till the 1860s anti-Catholicism and anti-ritualism within the Anglican Church were 
major themes of what John Wolffe (1991) has called "the Protestant Crusade'. This implied widespread 
agitation and popular mobilisation of both Protestants and Catholics. Again, I would suggest that we see 
them in their interaction. Both Evangelicals and Catholics were eager to underline their nationalism. Protes- 
tants in particular liked to emphasize their link to that paramount symbol of imperial nationalism, Queen 
Victoria (WoHe 1991: 309).While Irish catholics obviously emphasized their Irishness, English catholics were 
trying even harder to distance themselves from allegation of anti-national allegiance to the Pope. My 
contention is that both movements helped -cantly in creating an imperial and missionary nationalism, 
characterized by superior national qualities of a ruling race: a nation with a mission. As Michael Creighton, 
Anglican Bishop of London, asserted at the turn of the century, "the question of the future of the world is. 
the existence of Anglo-Saxon civilsation on a religious basis' (quoted in Robbins 1983. 471). Creighton 
explicitly had the Church of England in mind when speakhg about 'the conquest of the world', but I would 
suggest that religious diversity was encompassed by a notion of the duties of a superior race. 
The notion of racial superiority in the second half of the 19th century depended to an important 
extent on comparison. Civilization was defined by its antithesis, barbarism or savagery. The internal rivalries, 
animosities and political conOicts within British Christianity faded into the background of what came to be 
seen as the difference between British Christian civilization and the barbarity of the colonized peoples. The 
Biblical a£6rmation that humankind was one, derived from one single pair in the Garden of Eden as well as 
the Enlightenment notion of universal sameness and equality were rapidly giving way to ideas of radical 
racial difference in the second half of the 19th century (Young 1995: 47). Philologists like Renan and Max 
Mder equated race 2nd language and Recan iserted the right of superior races to colonize inferior ones. 
Whcre Thomas Arnold had been very concerned about the relation between religion and nation, his son 
Matthew Arnold, the author of Culture and Anarch! relocated that concern by emphasizing a racialized view 
of culture. That the Arnoldian view of culture continued to be religiously inspired should be dear from the 
following quotation from Culture and Anarchy: 
"The aim of cuture [is to set] ourselves to ascertain what perfection is and to make it 
prevail, but also, in determining generally, in what perfection consists, religion comes to a 
conclusion identical with that which culture .... likewise reaches. Religion says: The Kingdom 
of God is within you; and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an internal 
condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from 
our animali ty...Not a having and a resting, but a growing and a becoming, is the character of 
perfection as culture conceives it; and here, too, it coincides with religion." (quoted in 
Viswanathan 1989: 19) 
It is important to note that Arnold was Inspector of Schools and in that capacity responsible for the 
education of the British in the new racialized mission of the nation. Modem science supported this 
ideological formation of national culture, in which language and race took central stage and the culture of 
the colonized was turned into an object of academic study, with its own university chair (Young 1995: 71). 
Gradually race comes to take precedence over religion as the dominant element in British nationalism in the 
second part of the 19th century. 
3. The Colonial Mission in India 
One of the great policy debates in the East India Company in the early 19th century was between 
Orientalists who argued that the Company should continue its policy of supporting native religious and 
educational institutions and Anglidsts who argued that there was little of value in these native institutions 
which should be replaced by the more civilized and advanced institutions of England. This was dearly a 
complex debate which was, more or less decisively, won by the Anglicists, when Thomas Babington 
Macaulay's Minute on Indian Education of 1835 was accepted as the basis of official policy. In this battle 
Evangelicals sided with Anglicists. Evangelicals, such as those of the Clapham sect ( U T i  Wilberforce, 
Zachary Macaulay, John Venn, Samuel Thornton, Charles Grant) prominent in the anti-slavery campaign, 
were indignant at the support the Company had given to Hinduism and Islam in India. They concurred with 
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the Utilitarian Anglicists in the2 Oisdain for the native institutions and literatures of India. Wfiam 
Wilberforce told the English P a r b e n t  that the Orienialists were as skeptical about Christianity as the 
French revolutionaries whose actions it regarded with horror (Viwanathan 1989: 102). Not only should the 
Company allow missionaries to work in India (which it did after 1813), but it should stop the support of 
native institutions. 
In the early decades of the 19th century the Company was still giving patronage to Hindu temples 
and festivals, especially in the South. Under strong presure of the Evangelicals the Company had to withdraw 
from that policy. It did so very hesitantly. Even as late as 1838 a committee had to be formed in England for 
the purpose of " diffusing information relative to the connexion of the East India Company's Government 
with the superstitious idolatrous systems of the natives, and for promoting the dissolution of that connexion" 
(Oddie 1991: 57). We have to see this as a withdrawal of sorts, however, since the British became active in 
stting up systems and committees to manage religious endowments. These committees became important 
arenas for o r g a n a  the public sphere, for both Hindus and Muslims. As s u 4  it was another instance of a 
new colonial politics of representation which replaced the older patronage networks, in which the Company 
had participated to further its prime purpose, trade. 
Utilitarians and Evangelicals agreed that the religious institutions of India needed to be dismantled 
and replaced by Christian civilization. They disagreed, however, on how to bring civilization to the natives. 
Religious neutrality was seen as essential first for trading purposes and later to British rule in India. The 
Company continued to resist direct support for missionary projects. The Anglican Society for the Propagation 
of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (est. 1701) had always been a colonial church providing dergy for the British 
in the colonies until it was transformed in the 1830s under evangelical influence (Stanley 1990: 61). Serious 
missionary activity among the natives originated only in the 19th century outside the Company in evangelical 
circles which raised money from the British public The Company's neutrality, however, did nothing to 
prevent attempts to reform Indian society through education, an endeavour fully supported by the Utiliarian 
Anglicists. Th4 however, turned out to be a field in which missionaries were extremely active. 
Whatever the debates between Evangelicals md Utilitarians -and they were considerable- none of 
them would have denied that civil society and the forms of knowledge on which it was based were ultimately 
part and parcel of Christian avilization. Gauri Viwanathan has argued forcefully that the teaching of 
'secular' English literature, as recommended in Macaulay's Minute, amounts to a relocation of cultural value 
from belief and dogma to language, experience, and history (Viwanathan 1989: 117). This is a relocation 
which can be detected in the intellectual differences which simultaneously divide and conned Matthew 
Arnold with his father Thomas as well as Thomas Babiion Macaulay with his father Zachary. Despite their 
differences these people are in the same moral universe. Their differences are not about the moral mission 
of the state, but about matters of policy. The developments in that universe are similar in Britain and among 
the British in India. For Evangelicals and Utilitarians the world was not anymore limited to England or 
Greater Britain. The Anti-Slavery campaigns had made the British public aware of the role of Britain in a 
larger world. That that role had to be one of reform and upliftment friend and foe could agree upon. 
However much the British tried to hide the Christian roots of their colonial polides behind the mask 
of religious neutrality, the colonized 'natives' were not to be fooled. It is often observed that there were great 
differences between the operations of the missionary societies in India and those of the state, but these were 
differences within a shared colonizing project. It is certainly true that the officers of the company and later 
the colonial state looked down upon the missionaries and that, in general, there was a substantial social gap 
between them. Nevertheless, their concerns colluded in the cruaal fields of education and reform, as they did 
back home in ~ritain.' The real difference was, obviously, not between the colonial state and the missionaries, 
but between the colonizing British and the colonized Indians; Where in Britain the state would gradually 
occupy the social spaces opened up by the religious organhions, in India these spaces were occupied by 
rival religious organizations of native 'subjects'. Their ideas and actions could not be incorporated in a British 
nation characterized by its Christian civilhation. In due course they became oppositional towards the colonial 
state and, by the same token, bearers of Indian nationalism. 
Despite the official policy of religious neutrality the British interfered with every aspect of Indian 
religion and society. Considering the nature of the colonial project there was actually no choice and the 
tropes of 'withdrawal', 'secularity' and 'neutrality' only tried to hide that discursively. I will have to limit 
myself here to a discussion of the British involvement with Hind-ism and its consequences, but I want to 
suggest that the developments which took place in Indian Islam and Sikhism were not altogether different 
(van der Veer 1994). The policies of the British set off a whole chain of reformist reaction in Hinduism. As 
in the case of the Evangelical "awakening' in Britain the causalities involved are extremely complex and I do 
not want to see Reform merely as reaction to the colonial project. What I would like to draw attention to, 
however, is the creation of a public sphere by reformist organizations in a way that reminds one of the 
evangelical activities in Britain. I want to look briefly at the construction of 'Hindu spirituality' in the Brahmo 
Samaj and the Ramakrishna mission as well as at the construction of the 'Aryan race' in the Arya Samaj. 
One of the early instances of a "Hindu public" responding to colonial rule is at the occasion of the 
abolition of sati (widow immo1ation)'by the British in 1829. Sati was perhaps the most definite sign of Hindu 
depravity and Christian moral superiority evangelicals could get. Consequently they focused their campaign 
against native inStitutions on the abolition of this particular practice. They succeeded to convince Governor- 
general William Bentinck, who later also enacted Macaulay's Anglicist proposals for Indian education. A 
statue for Bentinck, erected soon after his departure from India in 1835, showed a sati scene under 
Bentinck's stem figure, and in an inscription on the rear of its base, it was recorded that Britain was now 
committed to 'elevate the moral and intellectual character' of the Indian subjects (Metcalf 1994: 95). Beneath 
the evangelical moralism, however, one may well detect here a sexual fantasy of "white men saving brown 
women from brown men" (Spivak 1988). 
More iplportant than the evangelical actions and the government's responses is the position taken by 
'enlightened' citizens of Calcutta. Rammohan Roy (1772-1833), sometimes called "the father of the Bengal 
Renaissance" wrote between 1818 and 1832 a great deal on the subject. In January 1830 Rammohan, together 
with 300 residents of Calcutta, presented a petition to Bentinck in support of the regulation proh'biting SATI. 
Rammohan rejected the pradice on the basis of his reading of Hindu scripture. He distiqpkhed 
authoritative sources (such as the Vedas) from other sources. It is interesting to note that he did not refer to 
any authoritative interpretation of these sources by learned gurus, but entirely relied on his private, rational 
judgement. This is certainly an important step in the laicization of Hinduism. What we also see here, is the 
importance of scriptural authority which can be referred to by a lay person wittout mediation of a saaed 
interpreter. One of Rammohan's most important objectives was to abolish the rules of the caste-based, 
hereditary qualification to study the Veda (Halbfass 1WI: 205-206). Following Lata Mani (1990), I would 
suggest that the colonialist insistence on the unmediated authority of written evidence for Indian traditions, 
enabled by the orientalist study of these texts, made a gradual shift in emphasis from the spoken to the 
written possible in ~ind&m. I would ad4 however, that the centrality of the text was also insisted upon by 
the evangelicals who railed against the sati practice. Ramamohan's position participated in both the 
orientalist and the protestant ways of thinking. His privileging of his own rational judgement, based on 
reading and discussion. enabled the rise of a public and a certain kind of public debate in Habermas's sense. 
Rammohan was strongly influenced by English and American unit-' a Christian creed 
characterized by a rational and universalist theology as well as a social reformist conscience. He contributed 
to its theology an interesting tract, called The Prece~ts of Jesus, published in 1820. He was very interested in 
Christian theology and, to a certain degree he was a Unitarian, but, as his involvement in the Satidebate 
shows, he also remained a Hindu. In 1828 Rammohan founded the Brahmo Samaj. This was a small 
movement, propagating a deist and universalist kind of religion, based, however, on Hindu sources and 
especially the Uparushads and the philosophical commentaries on the Upanishads (together known as the 
Vedanta). It was particularly opposed to "superstitious customs" of "ignorant people", deceived by their 
x., 
Brahman leaders. The deception by Brahmans is a crucial point. It is, of course, tempting to see it as a 
straightforward adoption of British attacks on Brahmans, as, for example in James Milt's Historv of In&& 
but I would suggest that it is a bit more complex than that. Roy himself came from a Brahman family and 
his attack is based on his reading of Brahmanical sources. The British attack on Brahman priests gave 
support to a particular argument against priesthood in a Brahmanical debate about religious authority. 
Christian rational religion and certain Brahmanical arguments, of long standing, fitted together quite well as 
the basis of a Hindu rational religion. Reason and "the dignity of human b e i i "  became as important for it 
as for its Christian counterparts in Europe. Also interesting w& its attempt to come to a Universal Religion, 
reminiscent of the Deist view that the great truths of religion were all universal and that true religion was 
ultimately natural religion, not bound to particular historical events of revelation wkich divided one religious 
community from another (Taylor 1989: 273-274). 
What I would like to stress is the strong parallellism of the development of Indian and European 
"rational religion". There is, however, a crucial difference: whereas the European Christians tried to 
universalize their Christian tradition, Indian Hindus did the same with their Hindu tradition. This reproduced 
the opposition Hindu-Christian which was also the opposition colonized-colonizer. Colonialism provides the 
discursive frame in which Hidu  rational religion emerges. As Ranajit Guha (1993) demonstrates, this is also 
dear in the work of someone outside the circle of the Brahmo Samaj, the humanist thinker Bankimchandra 
Chattopadhyay (1838-1894), who was very much influenced by August Comte. Bankimchandra (again a 
Brahman), like many European thinkers, centers his view of "humanness" (manusvatva) on the notion of the 
perfectability of man. In contrast to European thinkers, however, he thought it possible to give examples of 
Adarsa Purush. "ideal man" whose perfection had to be emulated. These examples were taken from Hindu 
religious history with, at the highest rank, the god Krishna. The most perfed man was thus a Hindu god. The 
Enlightenment question about the nature of man had thus found in the colonial setting a particular answer in 
terms of religious nationalism. 
The intellectual Vedantic and Unitarian views of the Brahmos left them to an important extent 
isolated from the larger Bengali H idu  society. In this larger environment a particular Bengali brand of 
Vaishnavite devotionalism had become important since the 16th century. This devotionalism focused on the 
God Krishna and on gurus who descended from the disciples of the great sixteenth-century guru Chaitanya. 
It is interesting to see that in the second half of the nineteenth century this devotional tradition had begun to 
exercize considerable influence on the rational religion of the Brahmos. In the 1860s Keshabchandra Sen 
(1838-84), one of the most influential Brahmo leaders, introduced devotional singing in the Brahmo 
congregational meetings (Kopf 1979). He also no longer spoke English, but Bengali He moved to the rural 
outskirts of Calcutta and introduced an ascetic lifestyle among his followers. The next step seems to have 
been his encounter with the contemporary guru, Ramakrishna (1836-86), a priest in a temple for the Mother 
Goddess Kali in Calcutta. In his two newspapers (one in English, one in Bengali) he introduced Ramakrishna 
to the wider, reading public as a true saint in the authentic Hindu tradition. In that way he authorized this 
illiterate Hindu ascetic as an acceptable guru for the Hindu middle classes. In a recent book on Indian 
nationalism Partha Chatte Gee (1993) portrays the meeting of these two personalities as constituting the 
'middle ground' occupied by the emergent middle dasses, between European rational philosophy and Hindu 
religious discourse. In his view this 'middle ground' enables the anticolonial nationalists to divide the world 
into two domains -the material, outer world which is dominated by Western science, and the spiritual, 
'inner' world of the home which is dominated by Hindu values. 
The spirituaIity of Hindu &ilktion, however, is not only signified by 'the home', but also by 
reformist and political action, such as, much later in Gandhi's non-violent action (satvaeraha). The theme of 
Hindu spirituality being in opposition to Western materialism definitely becomes the principal theme in 
Hindu nationalist discourse from this period onwards. A major step in the popularization of Hindu reformist 
ideas was made by linking it to emergent nationalism. "Hindu Spirituality" had to be defended against the 
onslaught of colonial modernity. Perhaps the most important expounder of the doctrine of 'Hindu spirituality' 
has been the founder of the Ramakrishna Mission, Vivekananda (18651902). Vivekanan& was an extre- 
mely talented student who had been thoroughly educated in contemporary Western thought. He joined the 
Brahmo S q a j  briefly before he met Ramakrishna 
'The encounter with Ramakrishna had a transformative impad on the young Narendranath Datta 
who adopted the name Vivekananda when he took hi. ascetic vows. As Tapan Raychaudhuri (1988) emphasi- 
zes, Vivekananda was "more than anything else a mystic in quest of the Ultimate Reality within a specific 
Indian tradition'. It is this tradition which was vividly presented to Vivekanan& not by leamed discourse in 
which he himself was a master, but by the charismatic presence of a guru, Ramakrishna, whose trances had 
first been treated as 'insaniw, but later became regarded as possession by the Goddess. What I want to 
argue is that the articulation of Brahmo 'rational religion' with the religious discourse of Ramakrishna 
produced the specific brand of "Hindu Spirituality" which Vivekananda came to propagate. 
The typical strategy of Vielrananda was to systematize a disparate set of traditions, make it 
intelledualty available for a westernized audience and defensible against Western aitique and incorporate it 
in the notion of 'Hindu spirituality', carried by the Hindu nation which was superior to 'Western 
materialism', brought to India by an aggressive and arrogant 'British nation'. His major achievement was to 
transform the project to ground 'Hindu spirituality' in a systematic interpretation of the Vedanta (the 
~~an i shads  and the tradition of their interpretation). This project which started with Ramrnohan Roy and 
had produced Rational Hinduism was now combined with disciplines to attain perfection from the ascetic 
traditions in what Vivekananda called "Practical Vedanta". The practical side also included participation in 
social reform. This kind of "Spiritual Hinduism" has later been carried forward by Mahatma Gandhi and 
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, but it has also become a main inspiration for the current brand of Hindu nationa- 
lism today. 
A good example of the construction of Hindu Spirituality are Vivekananda's efforts to systematize 
disparate notions of ascetic practice in an 'ancient system of yoga' which is now India's main export-article on 
the 'spirituality-market'. Yoga is a.Sanskrit word that one can translate with "discipline". The classical text is 
Patanjali's YogcrSu~ms which is probably composed round the tifth century AD. Vivekananda systematized 
this tradition in a doctrine of salvation, in which rational thought, Patanjali's ideas on meditation, social 
action and religious devotion .were combined. This is a new doctrine, although Vivekananda emphasized that 
it was "ancient wisdom". It is a remarkable step in systematizing 'Hindu spirituality' as healthy for body and 
spirit. It is also noteworthy that Vivekananda's project got a major impetus when he was enthusiastically 
received in Europe and the USA. His visit to the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 made 
him a celebrity in the USA and consequently also in India. His new status as international guru strengthened 
his view of India's contribution to world civilization. 
A major element of Vivekananda's message was nationalist. He saw his projed very much in terms 
of a revitalization of the Hindu nation. In 1897 he founded an ascetic order, the Ramakrishna Mission, to 
make ascetics available for the nationalist task. National self-determination, social reform and spiritual 
awakening were all linked in his perception. The Ramakrishna Mission established itself throughout India 
and also outside of India. It did not become a mass-movement, but Vivekananda's rhetoric of spiritualism 
exerted an immense influence on the way Hindu gurus in the twentieth century came to communicate their 
message. Vivekananda transformed Hindu discourse on asceticism, devotion and worship into the nationalist 
idiom cf 'senice to the nation' for both men and women. 
Vivekananda's construction of 'Hindu spirituality' gave the s a d d  notion of 'self-sacrifice' a new 
meaning which drew simultaneously from Hindu traditions of devotion (bhakti) and evangelical notions of 
female morality. We have here a complex mkdure, in which 'femininity' is the kiPnifer of 'Hindu spirituality', 
while actual women should be self-sacrifing in accordance to both Victorian notions of 'domesticity' and 
Hindu notions of total devotion to their husbands. The abolition of sati by the colonial government thus set a 
far-reaching series of Hindu responses in motion which, ultimately, led to the formation of a modem 
conception of spirituality through which the Hindu nation got defined. 
While gender was the dominant issue in the prohibition of sati and crucial to the definition of 
'Hindu spirituality' with its emphasis on 'feminine devotion and self-sadce' (van der Veer 1996), race and 
caste formed the dominant issue in the formation of 'Hindu Aryanism'. The mutiny of sepoys of the Bengal 
army and the ensuing revolt in northern India in 1857 as well as its suppression in 1858 contriiuted 
immensely to the notion of racial and religious difference between the colonizers and the colonized. In this 
period of great anxiety about the loss of control over India stories about inhuman atrocities inflicted on 
British women and children were rapidly circulated throughout Britain and confirmed the general view of the 
barbarity of the Indians which was already established in the depiction of sati. The suppression of the revolt 
demonstrated once and for all to the British that they were a superior race. This feeling was most clearly 
(and outrageously) expressed by Charles Dickens: 
"I wish I were commander in Chief in India. The first thing I would do to strike that 
Oriental race with amazement (not in the least regarding them as if they lived in the Strand, 
London, or at Camden Town, should be to prodaim to them in their language, that I 
considered my holding that appointment by the leave of God, to mean that I should do my 
utmost to exterminate the Race upon whom the stain of the late cruelties rested; and that I 
was..mow proceedin& with all convenient dispatch and merciful swiftness of execution, to 
blot it out of humankind and raze it off the face of the earth". (Charles Didtens, T h e  Perils 
of Certain Engtish Prisoners", 1857, quoted in Young 1995: 120-121) 
Evangeli& however, argued that the British had not taken their civWng mission as a superior race serious 
enough. They took the events as divine judgement upon Britain for her sins as a nation. These sins consisted 
largely out of a negled of the Company to promote the (i'ospei. Gn Siurday, 7 october 1857 a great number 
of churches in Britain, both Anglican and Nonconformiist, participated in 'a day of national humiliation', 
proclaimed by Queen Victoria (Stanley 1983: 279). In the sermons of that day airnost every preacher weed  
upon the necessity to wipe out that humiliation, to repress the revolt by military means and to inflict 
retribution on the Indian population. The Christian qualities of some of the British officers during the revolt 
were extolled at great length, just as Henry Havelock attributed his victory at Fatehpur "to the blessing of 
Almighty God on a most righteous cause, the cause of justice, humanity, truth, and good government in 
India" (Stanley 1983. 288). In the longer run, however, the revolt convinced mod colonial officers that 
conversion to ChrisEianity was an uphill struggle and reinforced the idea that religious neutrality was essential 
to colonial rule. For them it became difficult to see how the Indian barbarians would ever become equal to 
British Christians. Lord Canning dismissed the evangelical Herbert Edwardes, Commissioner of Peshawar, as 
'exactly what Mahomet would have been if born at Clapham instead of Mecca" (quoted in Metcalf 199448). 
Racial difference between the British and the colonized and among the colonized themselves became the 
explanation and legitimation of colonial rule. 
While this reinvigorated racism in India colluded with the rise of racial nationalism in the 
metropole, at the level of scientific thought the notion that the higher castes of India belonged to the same 
Aryan race as the British was widely accepted. In India the idea of race had to be combined with that of 
culture or civilization to explain why the British as 'younger brothers' of the Aryan family had to guide the 
'older brothers' to &&ation. This intervening cultural element continued to be religious diflerence. The 
story of the Aryan race in India was a story of decline, caused by a variety of things, such as racial mixing or 
climate, but especially by the inherent barbarity of Hindu polytheism. 
Ideas of race were not exclusively theoretical, but also informed recruiting patterns for the army 
which included 'martial' races, such as the Punjabi S i  and excluded 'effeminate' races, such as the 
Bengalis. Another important distinction was between 'the Aryans' and the 'Dravidians' in South India. The 
missionary Robert CaldweU based his linguistic and ethnological theories about Dravidian languages and 
peoples on that distinction. In the second half of the nineteenth century he developed a myth of the Aryan 
(Brahmanicd) invasion of South India and the subsequent subjection of the Dravidian people to a Hindu 
caste system in which the invaders were on top. His argument was meant to support his own missionary work 
among the 'original' Dravidian population by delegitimizing Brahman priests, but ultimately his theory of a 
Dravidian race was used in the South for political purposes which had notlung anymore to do with Christian 
conversion (see Dirks 1995). 
The Aryan race theory was taken up in northern India by Hinduism's most important reformist 
movement, the Arya Samaj. Its founder, Swami Dayananda Sarasvati (1824-1883) was one of India's many 
gurus in the nineteenth century. He was initiated in the order of the Shivaite Dashanamis, a prestigious 
Hindu ascetic order, that only allowed Brahmans to take the ascetic vows. Just as other ascetics of his order 
Dayananda travelled through India, visiting sacred places. He became rather successful and seemed on his 
way to form his own, limited community of ascetic and lay followers. In 1872 Dayananda visited the Brahmo 
leader Debendranath Tagore in Calcutta for four months. This visit seems to have transformed his style. He 
abandoned his ascetic robe and exchanged his use of Sanskrit oratory for Hindi (Jones 1976: 34). 
Dayananda did already have a strong reformist sense that Hindu religion had degenerated and that it 
had to be revitalised. In his own representation he had been summoned by his own, blind, guru of the 
Dashanami order to campaign for a return to a pristine Hinduism based on the Vedas. This was a command 
entirely within the Hindu discursive tradition, in which the Vedas are seen as the ultimate, authoritative 
source of knowledge. Ti  Dayananda appeared on the stage it was, however, more or less an imaginary 
source. Knowledge of the Vedas was transmitted in Brahman families, largely orally with some help from 
manuscripts. Moreover, the Vedas are lengthy, obscure texts, riddled with internal contradictions, by no 
means a straightforward source for authorisation of human practice. In this period, however, Max Mder,  the 
towering figure of onentalist scholarship in Britain, had provided a definitive edition and translation of the 
Rg-Veda, financially underwritten by the East-India Company. This was one of the major gifts brought to 
India by the Prince of Wales on his tour in 1875-1876. Dayanand thus accepted the degeneration doctrine, 
implicit in the Aryan theory. Hinduism as it a d d y  existed was a degeneration of a pristine Aryan religion, 
as laid down in the Vedas. 
It is not possible to follow here in any detail the development of Dayananda's thinking and of the 
movement, called Arya Samaj (the Society of Aryans), that he founded in Bombay in 1875. Let me just 
summarize the points which made Dayananda's Aryan religion (Arya Dharm) a radically new religious 
program. First of all, he proposed to get back to the basic Vedic texts, to supersede the traditional 
commentators of these texts. He provided his own Sanskrit commentaries to these texts, in which he sought 
to show that all the scientific knowledge of the West in fact was already present in the Vedic revelation. He 
spoke of the Vedic teachings of telecommunications, about the construction of ships and aircraft and about 
gravity and gravitational attraction. The importance given to science and its appropriation is, of course, 
extremely smcant. Vedic religion was a universal, rational religion of an Aryan people. It was the cradle of 
all human civilization. In this we can see the influence of the "rational religion" arguments in Calcutta. 
Like the Brahmos Dayananda argued that the Vedic revelation was monotheistic. A monistic 
argument could very well be developed from an early medieval interpretation of the Upanishads by Shankara, 
the founder of the Dadmumiis, the order to which Dayananda belonged. Moreover, there is also a 
monotheistic tendency in the ascetic orders which focus their meditation on one god. Dayananda, however, 
wanted to obscure the reference to many gods in the Vedic hymns. He did not use the traditional Hindu 
argument that one particular god is higher than all the other gods (or that he encompasses all the others). 
He wanted to get rid of the Hindu pantheon and the practice of image worship. 
In the nineteenth-century European evolutionary worldview monotheism was seen as the highest 
form of religion. A religion had to be monotheistic to be rational and to allow a scientific understanding of 
the world. In that sense Dayananda's discourse on Hindu monotheism looks derivative, but I would like to 
draw attention to the very specific Hindu, discursive underpinnings. The reference to the Vedas, the monism 
of the Vedanta and the monotheism of the Shaivites and their depreciation of image worship are all present 
in Dayananda's thhkhg. The lay response to Dayananda's message was also very much predetermined by 
existing Hindu discursive frames. Dayananda's rejection of image worship limited the appeal of his message 
considerably. Image worship is the dominant form of worship in popular Hinduism and it is inconceivable 
that a radical iconoclastic movement would succeed in India. The Arya Samaj did, however, have a conside- 
rable following in the Punjab, where one frnds a long history of imageless worship. 
Secondly, an important point in Dayanatda's program was an attack on the caste system which he 
saw as a degeneration of the original, natural ordering of Vedic society in four functional groups: priests, 
Q 
warriors, traders and servants. This natural order was entirely rational and functional, if only it was based on 
achievement rather than ascription. Dayananda's privileging of this ancient social hierarchy may have been 
related to the fact that the census operations, starting in the 187Os, tried to use it to rank actual castes 
(whose social relations were only salient on a regional basis) hierarchically on an All-India basis. As Bernard 
Cohn (1987) has powerfully argued, the census operations enhanced the importance of caste distinctions in 
the new arenas for competition created by the British. Dayananda's solution to take over the All-India grid of 
. . 
the census, explain it in functional terms, and do away with actual hereditary caste relations was original and 
radical. It was used mucklater in Gandhi's social philosophy to include the untouchables in the Hindu 
nation. 
More than anything else this meant in the Arya Samaj that everyone -of whatever caste- could 
become priest and officiate in the principal rite of the Arya Samaj, the Vedic sacrifice, which is commonly 
the strict prerogative of Brahmans. Despite his emphasis on Brahmanical scripture and Brahmanical ritual 
- +, 
Dayanand launches here a direct attack on the ritual hegemony of Brahman priests. Dayananda continues 
here a-discourse on priesthood which, as we have seen with Rammohan Roy, has its rwts both in Brahmani- 
cal debates and in colonial attacks on Brahmans. Dayananda takes his attack one crucial step further by allo- 
wing non-Brahmans to perform the vedic saaifice. While this had a wahlverwantschaft with the aspirations of 
a new dass of English-educated Indian officials, Dayananda's program was too radical for many. Again, it 
had most of its appeal in the Punjab, where religions like Sikhism had not only done away with the worship 
of images, but also with Brahman priesthood. We have to see the radical novelty of Dayananda's program: 
the Arya Samaj became a religious community in which all religious power gravitated towards the laity. 
Dayananda was after his death not succeeded by another guru, but by a committee of lay members. 
A third important point of innovation was the great emphasis the Arya Samaj put on education, A 
large number of schooIs were founded in the Punjab and elsewhere which till today also attract many non- 
Arya hindu students. This kind of social activity made the Arya Samaj into a strong competitor of the 
Christian missions. Following the Arya Samaj a great number of religious movements, with or without a 
core of ascetic gurus, entered the quickly expanding fields of education, social welfare and medical care. The 
C 
Arya Samaj had discovered the larger Indian public as the target of internal missionization. Special rituals 
were devised to purify those who had been converted to other religions and to bring them back to the Hindu 
fold. The larger Indian public also came to include those who had left India as indentured labourers to work 
in British plantations overseas. Arya Samaji missionaries were sent to these areas and had considerable 
succes in them. 
What we see here is that the Arya Samaj became an important factor in the aeation of a Hindu 
public. It brought the debate about the nature of Hinduism in a much more direct manner to the popular 
masses than Rarnmohan or Bankim had been able to do. Dayananda's message developed in the colonial 
context from important Hindu discursive traditions and remained close to them. Dayananda was a prolific 
writer and talker who was constantly in debate with other Hindu leaders, following again an old tradition of 
the public contestation of religious opinion (~hastrartha). At the end of his life he found the revolutionary 
issue, the Protection of Mother Cow against British and Muslim butchers, which would introduce mass 
participation in the public sphere. 
4. Conclusion 
While much of what I have argued in this paper is tentative and preliminary, this is even more true for my 
conclusion. I hope to have conveyed that (1) religion has been aucial in the making of the modem nation- 
state in both Britain and India; and that (2) the processes of nation-building in these two countries have been 
connected through empire; and that (3) the imperial relation has affected the location of religion in Britain 
and India. The modem state depends in liberal theory on the formation of a civil society, considq of free, 
but civilized subjects, of a public sphere for the conduct of rational debate. In that theory the notions of 
'freedom' and 'rationality' are defined in terms of 'secularity'. I have tried to show that, contrary to that 
thmry, religio~ is a major source of rational, moral subjects mda major organizational aspect of the public 
spkerts :hey aeate. Anti-Slavery societies, Bible societies, Anti-Catholic agitation, anti-Sati petitions, 
Ramakrishna missions, Cow protection movements what they all have in common is the aeation of public 
spheres of political interaction which are central to the formation of national identities. The moral tenor of 
these movements is essential to the understanding of the mission of empire as well as the mission of anti- 
colonial nationalism. 
I hope also to have demonstrated that the supposition that the British polity is secular and the 
Indian religious is false. I have suggested that a sharp, structural distinction between nation and state cannot 
be made. In the modem period the nation-state is produced as a hyphenated entity, that is to say that they 
go together. There is, of course, a liberal notion that the state is outside of civil society and can be criticized 
by civil sxiety which limits the power of the state, but it seems to me that the modem state is not an entity, 
but a nexus of projeCts and arrangements through which society is organised. The externality of the state is 
an effect of these projects. It is especially through the project of education and through legal arrangements 
that the modem subject is formed As Mauss suggested, language, race and religion are also constructed in 
that process of nation-state formation. This is true for both the metropole and the colony. The moral mission 
of the modem state is to organize the health, wealth and welfare of its citizens and to be able to do that it 
has to get to know them through various projects of documentation, such as the census (Cohn and Dirks 
1988). The extent to which this knowledge is gathered through religious categories and the extent to which 
distriiution of power and services is done through religious organizations are perhaps indices of the 
'religiosity' or 'seahitf of a particular society. 
I have not dealt with this here, but it might be the case that in the twentieth century churches and 
other religious organizations gradually lost their previous importance in the organization of the nation-state 
in Britain as compared to labor organizations and political parties. Such a shift might be enabled by the 
growing centrality of scientific race theories in the definition of the British nation as compared to 
Chriakity. It was certainly also Britain's growing imperial power in the second half of the 19th century 
which allowed for racial fantasies of superiority. Moreover, the conceit of religious neutrality which was 
thought essential to imperial rule (perhaps even more after the revolt of 1857 than before), made race a 
better marker of difference than religion. At least it dowed some government officials to steer away from 
the constant evangelical pressure to promote Christianity in India. These imperial designs of religious 
neutrality (a neutrality it did not have in the metropole), however, did not prevent Indians from seeing it as a 
moral state with a defhte Christian morality. 
Obviously, the crucial difference between the modern state in the metropole and in the colony is that 
in the former case its project of political legitimacy is in terms of 'the nation', their citizenship and national 
identity, while in the latter case 'the subjects' are excluded from citizenship, while their national identity is 
either denied or denigrated. Religious and racial difference are both legitimations of differences of power. 
That is why anti-colonial nationalisms are not only struggles for power in the political arena, but also attempt 
to counter the cultural hegemony of the colonial theory of difference. They often do so, as in the cases 
discussed here, by posing an alternative interpretation of the grounds of hegemony, be it ,religion or race. 
Vivekananda posed the superiority of Hinduism's spirituality over and against Western materialism. In doing 
so he denied that Britain's Christianity passessed a superior morality which allowed the British to rule India 
Britain's ascendancy was, in bis view, only a material one which in fact had put to jeopardy the spiritual 
value British Christianity might have possessed. Dayananda took the Aryan race theory over from 
orientalism, but instead of accepting the theory that Christianity was to redeem the 'fallen state' of Hindu 
&ilkation he proposed a return to Vedic religion which had preceded Christianity and was the very origin of 
all morality. 
What I have not discussed in this paper is how these interactions which produced the notions of 
Hindu spirituality and the Aryan Hindu resulted not only in a strong Hindu nationalism against colonial 
oppression, but also in the exclusion of Muslims from the nation. In a period in which in Britain Catholics 
were more and more allowed to become part of the nation, in India Hindus and Muslims aeated their 
separate public spheres under the aegis of the religious neutrality and externality of the colonial state. This 
development was in my view very directly related to the way in which social relations were ordered under 
colonial conditions, but I will leave this for a later, more developed version of this paper. 
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